We analyze a model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in which the employer has better information about the firm's earnings potential and the employee is subject to moral hazard. The employee's contract consists of an annual bonus and stock options. We focus on two issues: how...

A recent wave of scandals in the corporate world has raised heated debates regarding the manipulation of earnings by firms' insiders. Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon and suggests measures for its elimination. In the present paper, we...

Existing literature studies the effect of asymmetric information on many aspects of debt financing including debt maturity and seniority, collateral, liquidation rights, convertible debt, income bonds and sinking funds. Less is known about the effect of asymmetric information on firms'...

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their types is usually based on the duality of good and bad types (GB approach), where good type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types hierarchy....

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their types is usually based on the duality of good and bad types (GB approach), where good type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types hierarchy....

We analyze a model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in which the employer has better information about the firm's earnings potential and the employee is subject to moral hazard. The employee's contract consists of an annual bonus and stock options. We focus on two issues: how...

We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot completely capture the results of his...

Following some recent empirical papers we focus on the key feature of quot;Pecking-order theoryquot; (POT) - the existence and the extent of asymmetric information between firms' insiders and outsiders. We analyze the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment and consider different...

This paper analyzes the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm's insiders have private information about the firm's expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are...

Following some recent empirical papers we focus on the key feature of Pecking-order theory (POT) - the existence and the extent of asymmetric information between firms' insiders and outsiders. We analyze the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment and consider different...