This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

We report a series of experiments investigating the influence of feeling lucky or unlucky on people's choice of known-risk or ambiguous options using the traditional Ellsberg Urns decision-making task. We induced a state of feeling lucky or unlucky in subjects by using a rigged wheel-of-fortune...

This paper reports the results of experiments testing prevalence of non-neutral ambiguity attitudes and how these attitudes change as a result of interpersonal interactions. To address the first question we conducted experiments involving individual choice between betting on ambiguous and...

Experimental results on the Ellsberg paradox typically reveal behavior that is commonly interpreted as ambiguity aversion. The experiments reported in the current paper find the objective probabilities for drawing a red ball that make subjects indifferent between various risky and uncertain...

This article presents the results of a survey designed to test, with economically sophisticated participants, Ellsberg’s ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and Smithson’s conflict aversion hypothesis. Based on an original sample of 78 professional actuaries (all members of the French...

The Ellsberg Paradox demonstrates that people's belief over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of...

This paper surveys some economic applications of the decision theoretic framework pioneered by David Schmeidler. We have organized the discussion around three themes: financial markets, contractual arrangements and game theory. The first section discusses papers that have contributed to a better...

We consider two plausible and even natural examples of ambiguity aversion: the classical Ellsberg (1961) two-color paradox and a variant of the Machina (2009) reflection example. We extend the results of Baillon et al. (2011) and demonstrate that these two examples challenge the descriptive...