in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust … forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime. …

regulation or extended liability. Criminal sanctions, in the form of imprisonment, certainly bring benefits (and costs) in terms …We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects … deterrence effects before leniency programs were introduced. Previous simulations of the effects of fines ignore the different …

discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial … fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs …

whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal …

Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority … first best. ‘Moderate’ leniency programmes that only reduce or cancel sanctions, as implemented in reality, may also …’ punishment; and (c) increasing the riskiness of taking part to a cartel. …

-layer strict liability regime. Under this regime, corporations that self-report their employee misconduct incur a sanction that is …Corporate liability regimes have two major social goals: (i) inducing corporations to internalize all social … scholarly polemic has shown that none of the liability regimes recognized thus far in the literature efficiently satisfies both …