We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada...

This paper distils three lessons for bank regulation from the experience of the 2009-12 euro-area financial crisis. First, it highlights the key role that sovereign debt exposures of banks have played in the feedback loop between bank and fiscal distress, and inquires how the regulation of...

This paper distils three lessons for bank regulation from the experience of the 2009-12 euro-area financial crisis. First, it highlights the key role that sovereign debt exposures of banks have played in the feedback loop between bank and fiscal distress, and inquires how the regulation of...

On 5-6 September 2012 SUERF held its 30th Colloquium “States, Banks, and the Financing of the Economy” at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the Colloquium. All the papers in this publication discuss from different...

This paper evaluates the optimal bail-out and bail-in mix in the case of bankruptcy of Banco Espírito Santo (BES), SA, the second largest Portuguese private bank. The solution after the crisis of the BES, was to partition the bank into a good bank (Novo Banco (New Bank)) and keep the toxic...

This paper develops a new approach for conceptualizing and measuring the risk associated with bank failure. The price of this risk in risk-adjusted present-value terms is estimated at $170-340 million per annum (0.07-0.15% of GDP), representing the price of the financial risk that exists ex-ante...

Banks cannot be made fail-safe. But they can be made safe to fail, so that the failure of a bank need not disrupt the economy at large nor pose cost to the taxpayer. In other words, banks can be made resolvable, and “too big to fail” can come to an end. To do so, the authorities, banks and...

In general, banks play a growth-enhancing role for the real economy. However, distorted incentives for banks, depositors, and regulators in connection with bank insolvency may corrupt banks' credit allocation and monitoring decisions, leading to suboptimal real economic outcomes. A rules-based...

This paper analyzes the impact of rules-based bank insolvency resolution on real economic growth. Resolving insolvent banks can positively affect the real economy by overcoming moral hazard problems and improving banks’ credit allocation and monitoring. We propose a new indicator to measure...

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes...