We examine conditions under which a platform firm can exclude rivals by bundling a product that some on one side of the market regard as essential with its platform, and pursue implications for market performance. We show that the impact of an exclusive dealing contract between the upstream firm...

We investigate the effects of the availability of resources that can be expended in conflict on conflict intensity. We run a between-subjects Tullock contest in which we vary the contest budget from Low to Medium to High, while keeping the Nash equilibrium bid the same. We find an 'inverted...

In essay one, we examine nonlocalized competition in interest taxation between an arbitrary number of countries. Our focus is on the role of relative number of locked-in investors in asymmetric tax competition. We find that in equilibrium, small countries have advantages in tax competition. In...

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium...

This dissertation examines common value auctions in which bidder default is allowed. Contractual default on the part of bidders is commonly observed in many auction settings and yet has remained virtually unexplored in the literature. We develop a two bidder model of a common value auction with...

In Part I we develop a model of entry in which an entrant with private information about its production cost and cost of entry has an opportunity to trade in the stock of a single incumbent before entry. We assume an efficient stock market populated by risk-neutral liquidity sellers who randomly...

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze tacit collusion in infinitely repeated price-setting games with capacity constrained firms. The dissertation is comprised of three related essays. The first essay contributes to the literature on optimal penal codes in Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly...