Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs) in 2008-2011, for the first time this paper investigates the mechanism of political turnover for leaders as quasi-government officers in CSOEs. We find that: (1) the likelihood of promotion of...

This paper attempts to analyze corporate tax evasion in a principal-agent framework. We assume that the firm's profit is positively related to managerial effort and that the executive compensation is profit-based. In addition, we consider the situation where the manager might underreport the...

In this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game performances between the behavior- pattern “tit for tat” and the behavior-pattern “always...

In this paper, in order to study the strategic interactions between “cooperation”, “defection” and “altruistic punishment”, a mutation-selection dynamics, with the Prisoner's Dilemma as the background, has been established on an embedded Markov chain, proved the following...

In this paper, in order to study the strategic interactions between “cooperation”, “defection” and “altruistic punishment”, a mutation-selection dynamic, with the Prisoner's Dilemma as the background, has been established on an embedded Markov chain, proved the following conclusions:...

Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game...