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Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003
(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325144
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Credible group stability in multi-partner matching problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003
(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548
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Two-sided matching via balanced exchange : tuition and worker exchanges
Dur, Umut Mert; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011297547
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Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange : Tuition and Worker Exchanges
Dur, Umut - 2015
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036242
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019208
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How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange
Sönmez, Tayfun - 2016
Even though kidney exchange became an important source of kidney transplants over the last decade with the introduction of market design techniques to organ transplantation, the shortage of kidneys for transplantation is greater than ever. Due to biological disadvantages, patient populations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999371
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Ünver, M. Utku; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; … - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599511
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Two-sided matching via balanced exchange: Tuition and worker exchanges
Dur, Umut Mert; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131