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This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736875
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744259
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110936
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010389591
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246118
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014039946
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011975153
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013553364
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014532672