Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...

Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...

Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...

We study the pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of stochastic games with perfect monitoring, geometric discounting, and public randomization. Novel algorithms are developed for calculating the discounted payoffs that can be attained in equilibrium. We also provide implementations of...

We study the subgame perfect equilibria of two player stochastic games with perfect monitoring and geometric discounting. A novel algorithm is developed for calculating the discounted payoffs that can be attained in equilibrium. This algorithm generates a sequence of tuples of payoffs vectors,...

Consider repeated two-player games with perfect information and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set of payoff pairs V* of all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...