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Political economy of mechanisms
Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Michail Ju.; Tsyvinski, Aleh - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 76 (2008) 3, pp. 619-641
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003722229
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Modeling Inefficient Institutions
Acemoglu, Daron - 2006
Why do inefficient - non-growth enhancing - institutions emerge and persist? This paper develops a simple framework to provide some answers to this question. Political institutions determine the allocation of political power, and economic institutions determine the framework for policy-making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734829
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Modeling Inefficient Institutions
Acemoglu, Daron - 2021
Why do inefficient %uF818 non-growth enhancing %uF818 institutions emerge and persist? This paper develops a simple framework to provide some answers to this question. Political institutions determine the allocation of political power, and economic institutions determine the framework for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247019
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Modeling Inefficient Institutions
Acemoglu, Daron - 2006
Why do inefficient -- non-growth enhancing -- institutions emerge and persist? This paper develops a simple framework to provide some answers to this question. Political institutions determine the allocation of political power, and economic institutions determine the framework for policy-making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466731
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Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - In: The review of economic studies 80 (2013) 3, pp. 845-875
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010203296
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Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259739
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Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - 2011
so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We … are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We show that the main intuition, that checks and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303076
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A theory of political transitions
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - In: The American economic review 91 (2001) 4, pp. 938-963
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001612502
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Democratization or repression?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - In: European economic review : EER 44 (2000) 4/6, pp. 683-693
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001486893
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A theory of political transitions
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001446632