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We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of “extremists” who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573260
We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491715
In this essay, we provide a simple conceptual framework to elucidate the forces that lead to institutional persistence and change. Our framework is based on a dynamic game between different groups, who care both about current policies and institutions and future policies, which are themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823238
We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951006
We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815602
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175750
. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175752
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666486
. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661707
. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574256