A natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions: firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees and larger investments translate into higher wages. In particular, when wages are determined by ex post bargaining, the equilibrium is always inefficient:...

We develop a theoretical model of security investments in a network of interconnected agents. Network connections introduce the possibility of cascading failures due to an exogenous or endogenous attack depending on the profile of security investments by the agents. The general presumption in...

We develop a theoretical model of security investments in a network of interconnected agents. Network connections introduce the possibility of cascading failures due to an exogenous or endogenous attack depending on the profile of security investments by the agents. The general presumption in...

We develop a theoretical model of security investments in a network of interconnected agents. Network connections introduce the possibility of cascading failures, due to an exogenous or endogenous attack, depending on the profile of security investments by the agents. The general presumption in...

We build a model of online behavioral manipulation driven by AI advances. A platform dynamically offers one of n products to a user who slowly learns product quality. User learning depends on a product's "glossiness,' which captures attributes that make products appear more attractive than they...

We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and prices. The motivating example is a communication network where service providers invest in capacities and then compete in prices. Our model economy corresponds to a two-stage game. First, firms...