Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 53
Cover Image
Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
Torvik, Ragnar; Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - Institutt for Samfunnsøkonomi, Norges … - 2013
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or infuence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856734
Cover Image
Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James Alan; Torvik, Ragnar - Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics … - 2013
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or in?uence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010606913
Cover Image
The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring
Acemoglu, Daron; Hassan, Tarek; Tahoun, Ahmed - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
. According to our preferred interpretation, these events provide evidence that, under weak institutions, popular mobilization and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083238
Cover Image
Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James Alan; Torvik, Ragnar - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009220651
Cover Image
Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?
Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - In: American Economic Review 99 (2009) 2, pp. 298-303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999806
Cover Image
A Theory of Political Transitions
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - In: American Economic Review 91 (2001) 4, pp. 938-963
We develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution, especially when the opportunity cost is low, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005757451
Cover Image
Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development
Robinson, James A.; Acemoglu, Daron - In: American Economic Review 90 (2000) 2, pp. 126-130
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761542
Cover Image
The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption
Verdier, Thierry; Acemoglu, Daron - In: American Economic Review 90 (2000) 1, pp. 194-211
excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is …Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As … corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572925
Cover Image
Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - 2011
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303076
Cover Image
Weak States : Causes and Consequences of the Sicilian Mafia
Acemoglu, Daron - 2017
We document that the spread of the Mafia in Sicily at the end of the 19th century was in part shaped by the rise of socialist Peasant Fasci organizations. In an environment with weak state presence, this socialist threat triggered landholders, estate managers and local politicians to turn to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941840