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unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more … redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy … more costly to the elite, highly unequal cocieties are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574256
unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more … redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy … more costly for the elite, highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661707
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such … therefore be forced to choose between repression and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666486
An influential thesis often associated with De Tocqueville views social mobility as a bulwark of democracy: when … force making democracy less stable in societies with high social mobility: when the median voter expects to move up …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491901
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003750433
-fixed and time-fixed effects removes the statistical significance of income as a causal factor of democracy. We argue that their … reveals the strong effect of income on democracy. -- Democracy ; modernization hypothesis ; fixed-effects estimation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003764592
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003762165
We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815602
We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951006
We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491715