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The labour market and corporate structure
Acemoglu, Daron; Newman, Andrew F. - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013422384
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Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
Torvik, Ragnar; Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - Institutt for Samfunnsøkonomi, Norges … - 2013
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or infuence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856734
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Political economy of Ramsey taxation
Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 7, pp. 467-475
We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley–Judd...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577634
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Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James Alan; Torvik, Ragnar - Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics … - 2013
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or in?uence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010606913
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A theory of military dictatorships
Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - 2008
We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. Nondemocratic regimes need the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268860
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Persistence of civil wars
Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - 2009
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271578
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A Theory of Military Dictatorships
Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. Nondemocratic regimes need the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761843
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Persistence of civil wars
Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS - 2009
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459659
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Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States
Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Urbino - 2007
Inefficiencies in the bureaucratic organization of the state are often viewed as important factors in retarding … and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of … organization of the state, but they may expand the size of bureaucracy “excessively” so as to gain additional votes. The model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005558498
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Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a ‘political replacement effect.’ Innovations often erode elites’ incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124137