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Setting standards : information accumulation in development
Acemoglu, Daron; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013422337
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Changes in unemployment and wage inequality : an alternative theory and some evidence
Acemoglu, Daron - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000673939
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Matching, heterogeneity, and the evolution of income distribution
Acemoglu, Daron - In: Journal of economic growth 2 (1997) 1, pp. 61-92
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001220613
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Robust comparative statics in large dynamic economies
Acemoglu, Daron; Jensen, Martin Kaae - In: Journal of political economy 123 (2015) 3, pp. 587-640
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283132
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Changes in unemployment and wage inequality : an alternative theory and some evidence
Acemoglu, Daron - In: The economics of rising inequalities, (pp. 75-101). 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001759940
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Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942524
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Intellectual property rights policy, competition and innovation
Acemoglu, Daron; Akcigit, Ufuk - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 10 (2012) 1, pp. 1-42
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491299
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Competing engines of growth : innovation and standardization
Acemoglu, Daron; Gancia, Gino Alessandro; Zilibotti, … - In: Journal of economic theory 147 (2012) 2, pp. 570-601
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009663690
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Changes in unemployment and wage inequality : an alternative theory and some evidence
Acemoglu, Daron - In: The American economic review 89 (1999) 5, pp. 1259-1278
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001439189
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Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games
Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202604