Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for exemptions from the regulator to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds' investment restrictions, and...

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for exemptions from the regulator to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds' investment restrictions, and...

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending (i.e., a fund lending to other funds belonging to the same mutual fund family), fund families can obtain permission from the regulators to set up interfund lending programs. We analyze the determinants and consequences of such programs. We find...

Using micro-level panel data and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we study the effect of political uncertainty on household stock market participation. We find that households significantly reduce their participation and reallocate funds to safer assets during periods of...

We develop a new tail risk measure for hedge funds to examine the impact of tail risk on fund performance and to identify the sources of tail risk. We find that tail risk affects the cross-sectional variation in fund returns, and investments in both, tailsensitive stocks as well as options,...

We develop a new tail risk measure for hedge funds to examine the impact of tail risk on fund performance and to identify the sources of tail risk. We find that tail risk affects the cross-sectional variation in fund returns, and investments in both, tail-sensitive stocks as well as options,...

We investigate hedge fund firms' unobserved performance (UP), measured as the riskadjusted return difference between a fund firm's reported return and hypothetical portfolio return derived from its disclosed long equity holdings. Fund firms with high UP outperform those with low UP by 7.2% p.a....

We provide evidence regarding mutual funds' motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors' preference for...

This paper investigates the role of birth order on managerial behavior using rich data on familial background of US mutual fund managers. We find that managers who are born later in the sibling hierarchy take on more investment risks relative to first-born managers, but perform worse. Motivated...

We develop a new tail risk measure for hedge funds to examine the impact of tail risk on fund performance and to identify the sources of tail risk. We find that tail risk affects the cross-sectional variation in fund returns, and investments in both, tailsensitive stocks as well as options,...