Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending (i.e., a fund lending to other funds belonging to the same mutual fund family), fund families can obtain permission from the regulators to set up interfund lending programs. We analyze the determinants and consequences of such programs. We find...

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for exemptions from the regulator to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds' investment restrictions, and...

We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent...

We provide evidence regarding mutual funds' motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors' preference for...

We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent...

This paper studies the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure of mutual funds on the liquidity of disclosed stocks and on fund performance. We consider a theoretical model of informed trading with different mandatory disclosure frequencies. Using a regulation change in May 2004 that increased...

We examine the determinants and consequences of the multitasking phenomenon in the mutual fund industry where fund managers simultaneously manage multiple funds. We show that wellperforming managers multitask either by taking over poorly performing funds within fund companies (i.e., acquired...

We provide evidence regarding mutual funds' motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors' preference for...

We examine the determinants and consequences of the multitasking phenomenon in the mutual fund industry where fund managers simultaneously manage multiple funds. We show that wellperforming managers multitask either by taking over poorly performing funds within fund companies (i.e., acquired...

We show that mutual funds report their junior stakes in startups at 43% higher valuation than model fair values that consider multi-tier capital structures of startups. The latest-issued and most senior security is worth 48% per share than junior securities held by mutual funds, implying that...