This paper asks the question whether dissent votes in uncontested director elections have consequences for directors. We show that, contrary to popular belief based on prior studies, shareholder votes have power and result in negative consequences for directors. Directors facing dissent are more...

Institutional investors vote corporate proxies on behalf of underlying investors and beneficiaries. We show a strong relation between this voting and public opinion on corporate governance (as reflected in media coverage and surveys), with similarly strong results for voting by mutual funds. We...

We examine the extent and type of financial fraud committed by listed firms in China, stock market reaction to the detection and announcement of fraud, the characteristics of firms committing fraud, and the association between institutional ownership and financial fraud. One of our objectives is...

This paper investigates the voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Institutional investors restrict lendable supply and/or call back loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for...