In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a separation may increase efficiency. We show that efficiency can be...

Consider a licensing contract where a monopolistic grid sells a license to a competitive licensee. Unless it is regulated, the grid will exploit its monopolistic position which, in turn, will imply an exploitation of the consumers who buy the end product from the licensee. Therefore, the...

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage...

Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the...

In public procurement a temporal separation between award and actual contract allows private entrepreneurs who did not get the award to sue to become contractor. Hence, not only the award-winning entrepreneur, but also the losers will engage in relationship-specific investments. Unfortunately,...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718710000913">'International Journal of Industrial Organization'</A>, 29(2), 232-41.<P>Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized...</p></a>

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage...

We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot...

We show that under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licenser and the licensee bargain over the licensing fee, licensing decreases (increases) innovation by decreasing (increasing) the strategic (non-strategic) benefit from innovation. However, licensing increases innovation under a two-part...

Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the...