amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful … revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a …

implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers … implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. This …

implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers … implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. This …

implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers … implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. This …