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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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Knowledge, information, and expectations in modern macroeconomics : in honor of Edmund S. Phelps
Aghion, Philippe (ed.); Phelps, Edmund S. (honouree) - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001665258
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On partial contracting
Aghion, Philippe; Dewatripont, Mathias; Rey, Patrick - In: European economic review : EER 46 (2002) 4/5, pp. 745-753
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001668763
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should – in theory – provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023778
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023914
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025032
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On renegotiation design
Aghion, Philippe - In: European economic review : EER 34 (1990) 2, pp. 322-329
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001091049
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[Rezension von: Knowledge, information, and expectations in modern macroeconomics, in honor of Edmund S. Phelps, ed. by Philippe Aghion ...]
Spagat, Michael - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 114 (2004) 496, pp. 341-343
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002105996