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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should – in theory – provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023778
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023914
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025032
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531676
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531776
Cover Image
The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282523
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation
Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298