Showing 1 - 10 of 81
In a variety of settings, budgets are set by a committee that interacts repeatedly over many budget cycles. To capture this, we study a model of repeated multilateral bargaining by a budget committee. Our focus is on the transition of agenda setting power from one cycle to the next, and how such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576472
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584077
In models of dynamic multilateral bargaining, the literature tends to focus on stationary subgame perfect or stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which restrict attention to forward-looking, history-independent strategies. Evidence supporting such refinements come from environments in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431057
In a variety of settings, budgets are set by a committee that interacts repeatedly over many budget cycles. To capture this, we study a model of repeated multilateral bargaining by a budget committee. Our focus is on the transition of agenda setting power from one cycle to the next, and how such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011583217
Uses a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subjectʼs true...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011102238
In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049709
One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to – and do – engage in sometimes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931411
When the performances of agents are correlated (because of a common random component), contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank-order tournaments and piece-rate schemes. Although the theoretical advantage of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666056
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608811
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010112178