Showing 1 - 10 of 20
This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalisation implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489315
Rational choice models predict that political competition and political participation have opposite effects on the size of government. We investigate these theories using data from a panel of 18 Latin American countries during the 20th century. Our research builds evidence for the prediction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489318
This paper presents an argument in favor of foreign lobbying. We show how foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities and promote social objectives.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489333
We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in 10 Western European countries, 1860-1938. We show, .rstly, that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489366
This paper studies the relationship between corruption and sustainable development in a sample of 110 countries between 1996 and 2007. Sustainability is measured by growth in genuine wealth per capita. The empirical analysis consistently finds that cross-national measures of perceived and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727347
Many constitutions specify procedures that allow critical decisions to be made with a different rule from day-to-day decisions. We propose a theory of constitutional rules that explains why. The theory is based on the assumption that the type of decision can be observed, but not verified. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647376
We study equilibrium retention rules in a dynamic common agency game. The decision to reappoint or not is made by a committee consisting of two principals: the retention decision is uncertain if the two principals disagree. We demonstrate that all equilibrium paths exhibit what we call strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647476
Co-ordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market and macroeconomic performance. This paper provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. We focus on comparative studies of labour institutions in the OECD area that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647481
This paper proposes a model of workplace-specific unions that integrates two (conflicting) views of what unions do: one that unions mainly engage in rent extraction, the other that unions mainly engage in rent creation by providing agency services that increase workplace productivity. In our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647489
This paper suggests a new approach to analyze the causes of franchise extension. Based on a new dataset, it provides a detailed econometric study of the Great Reform Act of 1832 in the United Kingdom. The econometric analysis yields four main results. First, modernization theory only receives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650520