This paper analyzes a learning model where sophisticated market designers create new trading platforms and boundedly rational traders select among them. We ask wether "Walrasian'''' platforms, leading to efficient (market - clearing) trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If...

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market - clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are...

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether ‘Walrasian’ platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers...

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers...

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market - clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are...

This paper analyzes a learning model where sophisticated market designers create new trading platforms and boundedly rational traders select among them. We ask wether "Walrasian'''' platforms, leading to efficient (market - clearing) trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If...