In a provocative paper, Galí (2014) showed that a policymaker who raises interest rates to rein in a potential bubble will only make a bubble bigger if one exists. This poses a challenge to advocates of lean-against-the-wind policies that call for raising interest rates to mitigate potential...

This discussion by Franklin Allen was published as an appendix to Jean Tirole's paper "Illiquidity and all its Friends" when the paper was originally published as FEEM Nota di Lavoro 78.2010, prior to its publication in the Journal of Economic Literature in 2011, where the appendix no longer...

The Eurozone is in the midst of a deep crisis. We argue that the attempts to control government deficits and debts using the Stability and Growth Pact have failed. Moreover, austerity policies are inducing downward spirals in terms of growth. Political leaders have promised deeper political,...

Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. Because liquidity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, banks hold interregional claims on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, the...

This introduces the symposium on financial economics.

Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts. However, in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here. We consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. We show that, with...

Galí (2014) showed that a monetary policy rule that raises interest rates in response to bubbles can paradoxically lead to larger bubbles. This comment shows that a central bank that wants to dampen bubbles can always do so by raising interest rates aggressively enough. This result is different...