I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the … citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play … a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country's wealth among himself, the military, and the …

I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the … citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play … a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country’s wealth among himself, the military, and the …

I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the … citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play … a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country's wealth among himself, the military, and the …

I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the … citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play … a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country’s wealth among himself, the military, and the …

The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame … the benefit of revenge reacts to the destruction suffered in the past and the more asymmetric is the conflict. The authors …

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show … the open-loop equilibrium, the weaker faction exerts a higher effort when the stronger faction's military capability …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as …

such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party's intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … find that the expectation of a third-party's military assistance to an ally coupled with the third-party's limited …

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show … the open-loop equilibrium, the weaker faction exerts a higher effort when the stronger faction’s military capability …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as …