We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using … marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose … the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal …

We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using … marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose … the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal …

risk sharing is one benefit to marriage it is also limited by divorce risk. With search in the marriage market there may be … multiple equilibria diering not only in divorce rates but also in the role of marriage in providing informal insurance …

risk sharing is one benefit to marriage it is also limited by divorce risk. With search in the marriage market there may be … multiple equilibria diering not only in divorce rates but also in the role of marriage in providing informal insurance …

This paper considers how optimal education and tax policy depends on the risk properties of human capital. It is … positive or a negative education premium. In the same model a positive intertemporal wedge is optimal. A set of generalizations …, including non-observability of education, non-observability of consumption, and temporal resolution of uncertainty, are then …

This paper considers how optimal education and tax policy depends on the risk properties of human capital. It is … positive or a negative education premium. In the same model a positive intertemporal wedge is optimal. A set of generalizations …, including non-observability of education, non-observability of consumption, and temporal resolution of uncertainty, are then …

-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in …