We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

The authors identify and investigate the basic `hold-up' problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex ante cost for the contract to become feasible. They then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a contractual solution' to this hold-up...

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the...

We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the...

This note is a response to an unpublished paper by Evans and Thomas (1998) of which we have recently become aware. Evans and Thomas (1998) take issue with a paper that we published some years back on 'Cooperation and Effective Computability' in repeated games (Anderlini and Sabourian 1995). In...