This paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry. Advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programs, and the expected benefits to...

We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of ½-concavity and ½-convexity. The ”more concave” is...

Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and...

Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and...

Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and...

We apply Luce's choice axiomatic framework to oligopoly pricing of quality differentiated goods. The demand system is a probabilistic comparison of surpluses across products. Zero demands arise naturally, in contrast to the related CES and Mixed Logit models. With asymmetric products, high...

We use cumulative reaction functions to compare long-run market structures in aggregative oligopoly games. We fi?rst compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The aggregator stays the same, despite changes in the number of ?rooms...

We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and...

Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and...

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit and Stiglitz when firms sell several products. Both products and firms are envisaged as di?erentiated. We propose a nested demand model where consumers decide upon a firm then which...