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Logit equilibrium models of anomalous behavior : what to do when the Nash equilibrium says one thing and the data say something else

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Noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium

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The logit equilibrium : a perspective on intuitive behavioral anomalies

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Minimum-effort coordination games : stochastic potential and logit equilibrium

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Location, location, location

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Logit Equilibrium Models of Anomalous Behavior: What to do when the Nash Equilibrium Says One Thing and the Data Say Something Else

Anderson, Simon P.; Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A. - In: Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

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Noisy Directional Learning and the Logit Equilibrium

Anderson, Simon P.; Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A. - In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106 (2004) 3, pp. 581-602

We specify a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions toward higher payoffs, subject to normal error. This process generates a probability distribution of players' decisions that evolves over time according to the Fokker-Planck equation. The dynamic process is stable for all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157147