In continental Europe, banks are more and more replaced by non-bank institutional investors in the financing and control of firms. This must not imply a shift to arm's length finance, if these institutional investors develop relationships with firms similar to the traditional longterm bank-firm...

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members...

The present paper aims to analyze the major changes in the German system of cross-holdings between banks and industrial or financial companies. After an overview on the role of banks in bank-based versus market-based financial systems, and on the German system of corporate control, we focus our...

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members...

The present paper aims to analyze the major changes in the German system of cross-holdings between banks and industrial or financial companies. After an overview on the role of banks in bank-based versus market-based financial systems, and on the German system of corporate control, we focus our...

In continental Europe, banks are more and more replaced by non-bank institutional investors in the financing and control of firms. This must not imply a shift to arm's length finance, if these institutional investors develop relationships with firms similar to the traditional longterm bank-firm...