Showing 1 - 8 of 8
There is now wide agreement that under the pressure of the 2008 crisis serious flaws have emerged in the design of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a supranational architecture with the overarching end to generate and distribute collective benefits from integration and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012232136
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012170540
There is large evidence that European countries, the EMU in particular, are engaged in an interdependence war, i.e. non-cooperative policies with huge social and economic costs due to mutual negative externalities. In this regard, the EMU as a supranational institution with the overarching end...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956741
A freeze-out bond exchange offer can occur when a firm wants to replace an exist- ing bond, issued with a covenant, with a new bond that does not have this type of restriction. If the bondholders are not fully coordinated, the shareholders can make the exchange offer unfair to capture wealth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010579071
We present an axiomatic model of choice involving two agents, motivated by the experimental evidence on non-selfish preferences. We distinguish two classes of social preferences, depending on whether they are or not separable. Altruism and spite (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Cox et al., 2007) are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010670831
This paper addresses the emergence of cooperation in asymmetric pris- oners' dilemmas in which one player chooses after having observed the other player's choice (Trust Game). We use the finite automata approach with complexity costs to study the equilibria of the repeated version of this game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506446
A single, long-run policeman faces a large population of myopic would- be criminals. This paper shows that this interaction has counterintuitive comparative static properties. A forward-looking inspector might tolerate more law violations than a short-sighted one.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005140883
When contracts are not enforceable, or property rights are not clearly defined, individuals might lack an incentive to carry out costly investments even when they are socially efficient. Some recent contributions such as Ellingsen and Robles (2002) prove that this problem might be less dramatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628802