We compare the bargaining power of the patentee under American and English rules of legal costs allocation. Using the Nash Bargaining Game framework, we show that litigation can be a Pareto efficient outcome. The cooperative game framework allows us to examine how the institutional and market...

This study incorporates the concept of time into an analysis of patent litigation and licensing. We show that increasing imitation or litigation costs with a longer imitation lag or litigation time may have effects on licensing, settlement, and fees other than increasing the pecuniary costs. A...

With uncertain scope of patent protection and incomplete enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system effects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and...

With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation...