We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about...

We introduce a framework for analyzing Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite Arrow-Debreu exchange economies. A key feature is the way trade takes place. There are two main stages. In the first stage agents simultaneously choose prices and quantities of commodities they want to sell; in the...

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players' behavior deviates from rationality. Instead we assume that there exists a probability p such that all players play rationally with at least probability p, and all...

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometry of correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different...

We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover,...

Social media are at the center of countless debates on polarization, misinformation, and even the state of democracy in various parts of the world. An essential feature of social media is the ranking algorithm that determines how content is presented to the users. This paper studies the dynamic...

Recent theoretical and empirical work characterizes attention as a limited resource that decision-makers strategically allocate. There has been less research on the dynamic interdependence of attention: how paying attention now may affect performance later. In this paper, we exploit...

The author set up a simplistic agent-based model where agents learn with reinforcement observing an incomplete set of variables. The model is employed to generate an artificial dataset that is used to estimate standard macro econometric models. The author shows that the results are qualitatively...

The author sets up a simplistic agent-based model where agents learn with reinforcement observing an incomplete set of variables. The model is employed to generate an artificial dataset that is used to estimate standard macro econometric models. The author shows that the results are...