Defining the rules for monetary policy has been the subject of an extensive literature in monetary economics since the 1968 AMA presidential address by Milton Friedman. Starting from the contribution by Barro and Gordon (1983) the prevalent approach has hinged on optimal control techniques to...

The ability to adjust to changes in the environment (shifts in regime) has not been demonstrated in the models of individual behavior studied in the literature. This is an important issue that has not been given much attention in the learning literature. In this paper, we study the behavior of...

We introduce learning based on genetic algorithms in a principal-agent model of optimal contracting under moral hazard. Applications corresponding to this setting abound in finance (credit under moral hazard), public finance (optimal taxation, information-constrained insurance), development...

We study individual evolutionary learning in the setup developed by Deissenberg and Gonzalez (2002). They study a version of the Kydland-Prescott model in which in each time period monetary authority optimizes weighted payoff function (with selfishness parameter as a weight on its own and...

I study here a model of a two-country economy where agents update their decision rules using an evolutionary algorithm consisting of imitation and experimentation. This environment, in which perfect currency substitution exists, is convenient for studies of issues relating to international...

This paper investigates evolutionary adaptation in a coordination game with strategic uncertainty. This game is characterized by the multiplicity of Nash equilibria that can be ranked according to the payoff that players obtain. Two different equilibrium refinement concepts predict the selection...