We study the implications of procedural fairness on income taxation. We formulateprocedural fairness as a particular non-cooperative bargaining game and examine thestationary subgame perfect equilibria of the game. The equilibrium outcome is called tax equilibrium and is shown to be unique. The...

We show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a subgameperfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also have the converse result that randomization will...

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. Several papers in the literature obtain the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the unique limit of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies when...

Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner''s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a...

We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the unit interval. The acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by an acceptance rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic...

We consider non-cooperative multilateral bargaining games with endogenous bargaining protocols.Under an endogenous protocol, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a roundof bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important exampleis the...

Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution. In particular, in the present paper we study a model of non-cooperative multilateral bargaining with a very general proposer selection...

The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf [4] connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy...

The paper examines bargaining over a one--dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptance rule. We consider a class of delta-equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies that are free of coordination failures in the response stage.We show that along any...

It is well--known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be...