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Any procedure of social choice makes use of some types of information and ignores others. For example, the method of majority decision concentrates on people's votes, but pays no direct attention to, say, their social standings, or their prosperity or penury, or even the intensities of their...
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This chapter provides a survey of utilitarian theories of justice. We review and discuss axiomatizations of utilitarian and generalized-utilitarian social-evaluation functionals in a welfarist framework. Section 2 introduces, along with some basic definitions, social-evaluation functionals....
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This chapter is concerned with issues arising from the construction of ethical measures of inequality and poverty. The recent literature on measurement of inequality and poverty emphasizes the close connection between social welfare functions and ethical indices of inequality and poverty. This...
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Voting procedures focus on the aggregation of individuals' preferences to produce collective decisions. In practice, a voting procedure is characterized by ballot responses and the way ballots are tallied to determine winners. Voters are assumed to have clear preferences over candidates and...
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Social Choice traditionally employs the preferences of voters or agents as primitives. However, in most situations of constitutional decision-making the beliefs of the members of the electorate determine their secondary preferences or choices. Key choices in US political history, such as the...
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In this chapter we adopt the axiomatic approach in order to find (new) voting procedures to committees that are immune against deviations by coalitions of voters. We shall now describe our approach. Let G be a committee and let A be a finite set of m alternatives, m [greater-or-equal, slanted]...
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