Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This paper examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it, if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range...

Asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble asset for longer,...

Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This paper examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of...

Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This paper examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of...

Governments seemed unsuccessful in their attempts to stop bubbles through the use of warnings. This paper examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that the government issues such...

This study experimentally analyses traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. While asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models, our experiments show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble...