This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.

This paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and a strong entrant in a differentiated market. Suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm, but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself. Then the incumbent may allow entry of the...

Suppose competent economists obtain common information on business forecasts, and incompetent economists obtain independent information. If no one knows who is able, young economists mimic others because a forecast different from others indicated inability when it proves wrong. An older...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

Suppose competent economists obtain common information on business forecasts, and incompetent economists obtain independent information. If no one knows who is able, young economists mimic others because a forecast different from others indicated inability when it proves wrong. An older...

This paper analyzes the rationality of Japanese macroeconomic forecasters. It finds that Japanese individual forecasters are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in recession, and that they over-react to new information. Across forecasters, the magnitude of average forecast revisions is not...

This paper analyzes the rationality of Japanese macroeconomic forecasters. It finds that Japanese individual forecasters are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in recession, and that they over-react to new information. Across forecasters, the magnitude of average forecast revisions is not...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

This paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and a strong entrant in a differentiated market. Suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm, but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself. Then the incumbent may allow entry of the...

This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.