Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of re- sources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents’ preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the...

We study mechanism design in dynamic nonmonetary markets where objects are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types and quasi-linear payoffs in their waiting costs. We consider a general class of mechanisms that determine the joint distribution of the object assigned to each agent and...

We study matching policies in a dynamic exchange market with random compatibility, in which some agents are easier to match than others. In steady state this asymmetry creates an endogenous imbalance: hard-to-match agents wait for partners, while easy-to-match agents can match almost immediately...

School choice districts that implement stable matchings face various design issues that impact students' assignments to schools. We study properties of the rank distribution of students with random preferences, when schools use different tiebreaking rules to rank equivalent students. Under a...

Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of resources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents' preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the...