We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of...

Coherent-ambiguity aversion is defined within the (Klibanoff et al., Econometrica 73:1849–1892, <CitationRef CitationID="CR40">2005</CitationRef>) smooth-ambiguity model (henceforth KMM) as the combination of choice-ambiguity and value-ambiguity aversion. Five ambiguous decision tasks are analyzed theoretically, where an individual faces...</citationref>

This paper introduces the concept of the Testing Value into the analysis of environmental decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. This value emerges in situations where the probability of receiving information concerning future economic benefits and costs of development depends on the...

In this paper ambiguity aversion is measured through the maximum price the decision maker is willing to pay in order to know the probability of an event. Two comparative problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case buying information implies playing a lottery,...

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.

Research on integrative modeling has gained considerable attention In this paper ambiguity aversion is measured through the maximum price the decision maker is willing to pay in order to know the probability of an event. Two comparative problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an...

We define coherent-ambiguity aversion within the Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) smooth ambiguity model (henceforth KMM) as the combination of choice-ambiguity aversion and value-ambiguity aversion. We analyze theoretically ?ve ambiguous decision tasks, where a subject faces two-stage...

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in...