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Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2009

We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization of component …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218282

Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2009

We consider communication situations games being the combination of a TU-game and a communication graph. We study the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218643

Allocation rules for museum pass programs

Béal, Sylvain; Solal, Philippe - 2009

We consider natural axioms for allocating the income of museum pass programs. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015220062

Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2010

of the players and define the corresponding compensation vector. Then, we generalize this idea to cooperative games with … a communication graph. Firstly, we consider cooperative games with a forest (cycle-free graph). We extend the … consider cooperative games with arbitrary graphs and construct rooted spanning trees by using the classical algorithms DFS and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015220512

On the number of blocks required to access the core

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2010

the Davis-Maschler reduced-games is also pointed out. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015224181

The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games

Béal, Sylvain; Lardon, Aymeric; Rémila, Eric; Solal, … - 2011

In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an … et al. [2008] for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness …, 2004) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225570

On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2011

This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coalition structure core, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015226240

Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2012

We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states the two players incident to the link should be affected similarly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015230748

The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2012

introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007) in the context of TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sequential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231038

An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - 2012

For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015232174