We determine workforce composition and wages in firms in the presence of productivity spill-overs between co-workers. In equilibrium, workers' wages depend on the production struc- ture of firms, own group size, and aggregate workforce composition in the firm. We estimate the wage effects of...

We determine workforce composition and wages in firms in the presence of productivity spill-overs between co-workers. In equilibrium, workers' wages depend on the production structure of firms, own group size, and aggregate workforce composition in the firm. We estimate the wage effects of...

We determine workforce composition and wages in firms in the presence of productivity spill-overs between co-workers. In equilibrium, workers' wages depend on the production structure of firms, own group size, and aggregate workforce composition in the firm. We estimate the wage effects of...

We determine workforce composition and wages in firms in the presence of productivity spill-overs between co-workers. In equilibrium, workers' wages depend on the production struc- ture of firms, own group size, and aggregate workforce composition in the firm. We estimate the wage effects of...

We determine workforce composition and wages in firms in the presence of productivity spill-overs between co-workers. In equilibrium, workers' wages depend on the production structure of firms, own group size, and aggregate workforce composition in the firm. We estimate the wage effects of...

We determine workforce composition and wages in firms in the presence of productivity spill-overs between co-workers. In equilibrium, workers' wages depend on the production structure of firms, own group size, and aggregate workforce composition in the firm. We estimate the wage effects of...

We use data on Austrian firms and employees to estimate the effects of employer-provided training on productivity, wages, and the inequality of wages within firms. While the average amount spent on employer-provided training is low in general, we find a robust positive elasticity of training on...

Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others' work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we...

Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others' work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we...

Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and non-profit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Philanthropy or other Corporate Social Responsibility policies. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentives -- that take the form...