We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that the imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds outs pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of...

Carbon control policies in OECD countries commonly differentiate emission prices in favor of energy-intensiveindustries. While leakage provides a efficiency argument for differential emission pricing, the lattermay be a disguised beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade. Using an...

Individual OECD countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations of the impacts on the competitiveness of their own energy intensive industries and the potential for carbon...

We investigate the importance of ?what?-flexibility on top of ?where?- and ?when?-flexibility for alternative emission control schemes that prescribe long-term temperature targets and eventually impose additional constraints on the rate of temperature change. We find that ?what?-flexibility...

We motivate the formulation of market equilibria as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) in order to bridge the gap between bottom-up energy system models and top-down general equilibrium models for energy policy analysis. Our objective is primarily pedagogic. We first lay out that the MCP...

The formulation of market equilibrium problems as mixed complementarity problems (MCP) permits integration of bottom-up programming models of the energy system into top-down general equilibrium models of the overall economy. Despite the coherence and logical appeal of the integrated MCP...