This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in...

This paper constructs a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer to study a developing country’s choice of optimum tariffs and patent length. A Northern firm has a new good, which it must export to or produce in a Southern country. The Southern government simultaneously chooses an...

We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-renewable resource asymmetric game. We show that (i) there almost always exists a phase where both supply simultaneously positive quantities, (ii) when the high cost mine is exploited by a number of firms that goes to...

We revisit the seminal growth model with exhaustible resources, the so called Dasgupta-Heal-Stiglitz-Solow model (DHSS). For this optimal control problem with two state variables, we explicitly characterize the dynamics of all the variables in the model and from all possible initial values of...

This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms’ incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce...

We specify and solve a closed-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game, with a price-taking fringe. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game (à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes...

We provide the closed form solution to the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model. The DHSS model is based on the seminal articles Dasgupta and Heal (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974), Solow (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974) and Stiglitz (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974) and describes an economy with two assets, man-made...

In the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate, analytically...

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number...