We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-renewable resource asymmetric game. We show that (i) there almost always exists a phase where both supply simultaneously positive quantities, (ii) when the high cost mine is exploited by a number of firms that goes to...

We revisit the seminal growth model with exhaustible resources, the so called Dasgupta-Heal-Stiglitz-Solow model (DHSS). For this optimal control problem with two state variables, we explicitly characterize the dynamics of all the variables in the model and from all possible initial values of...

This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms’ incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce...

We specify and solve a closed-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game, with a price-taking fringe. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game (à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes...

We provide the closed form solution to the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model. The DHSS model is based on the seminal articles Dasgupta and Heal (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974), Solow (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974) and Stiglitz (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974) and describes an economy with two assets, man-made...

In the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate, analytically...

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number...

We determine the impact of free trade on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and incorporate it into the assessment of the net benefits of opening up to free trade. We show that such an analysis can reverse the conclusions reached within a standard one-shot game...

We build a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a common property productive asset oligopoly. We derive two surprising results. First, the steady state level of asset can be a decreasing function of the asset’s implicit growth rate. This phenomenon arises when the initial stock of asset is...

We study the stability of cartels in a dynamic oligopoly. We use the differential game model of an oligopoly with sticky prices (Fershtman and Kamien 1987). We show that when firms use closed-loop strategies and the rate of increase of the marginal cost is "small enough", the grand coalition...