Showing 1 - 10 of 57
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012659958
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012440477
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012498070
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240297
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242822
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012485517
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438462
We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012488036
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as … the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the …, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294786
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as … the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the …, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733217