Similar Search Results

Peers or police? : detection and sanctions in the provision of public goods

DeAngelo, Gregory; Gee, Laura K. - 2018

Sanctions are a common method to discourage free-riding in the provision of public goods. However, we can usually only sanction those who are detected performing the bad act of free-riding. There has been considerable research on the type of sanctions imposed, but this research almost always...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865465

Peers or Police? Detection and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods

DeAngelo, Gregory - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918262

Deterability by age

Bushway, Shawn; DeAngelo, Gregory; Hansen, Benjamin - In: International review of law and economics 36 (2013), pp. 70-81

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221334

Learning the ropes : general experience, task-specific experience, and the output of police officers

DeAngelo, Gregory; Owens, Emily - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 142 (2017), pp. 368-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926127

Learning the ropes : general experience, task-specific experience, and the output of police officers

DeAngelo, Gregory; Owens, Emily - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764218

Peers or police? : the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods

DeAngelo, Gregory; Gee, Laura K. - In: Games and economic behavior 123 (2020), pp. 210-227

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430727

Do civilian complaints against police get punished?

DeAngelo, Gregory; Gomies, Matthew; Romaniuc, Rustam - In: Public choice 196 (2023) 3/4, pp. 453-482

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014382609

Crime rates and police efficiency

DeAngelo, Gregory; Vitaliano, Donald F.; Lang, Hannes - In: Eastern economic journal 40 (2014) 4, pp. 535-559

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489718

Who's Who in Crime Network. Wanted the Key Player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2004

-cooperative way how much crime effort he will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional … removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player … player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320179

Delinquent networks

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848306